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of 1\[Plvin Swapp, deceased; DU 1\N
FINDLAY'; JAMES C. LIT:TL and
SARAH D. LITTLE, his 'vife; MARY~~ ,, 19 1961
1\l. LITTLE; l{A Y LITTLE; a single
rnan; \TAL LITTLE and \TIY'IAN -l'l.- - , pre~-~---(;"~~~::··ut~h----LITTLE, his "'"ife, EMMA LIT'TLE ;
NIELS LITTLE, a single man, and
F~\Y ALVEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFEN'DANTS AND RESPONDENTS
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON
151 North Main Richfield, Utah
Attorneys for Mary M. Little; Kay
Little, a single man; and Val Little
and Vivian H. Little, his wife
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
76 South Main Richfield, Utah
Attorneys for Duncan Findlay
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1

IN THE SUPREME

CO~U·RT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
JOliN YARDLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.MAX S\\'"APP, Executor of the Estate
of ~lelvin s"~app, deceased; DUNCAN
F l~DLA \'"; JAMES C. LIT'TLE and
SARAH D. LITTLE, his wife; MARY
~1. LITTLE ; KAY LITTLE; a single
n1an; , . . AL LITTLE and VIVIAN H.
LITTLE, his wife, EMMA LlT'TLE;
NIELS LITTLE, a single man, and
F..:\Y ALVEY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 9379

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS
STATE~IENT

OF F A~CTS
For all purposes in the instant Brief, the parties will
be referred to and page references to the transcript of
the trial will be made in the same manner and by the
same designations as those adopted and used in the
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant. However, it should be
noted that Respondents herein include Max Swapp, Executor of the Estate of Melvin Swapp·, deceased; Duncan
Findlay; i\fary ~I. Little; Kay Little, a single man; and
,~ al Little and -v·ivian H. Little, his wife. The remaining
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Defendants (James C. Little and Sarah D. L~ttle, his
wife; Emma Little; Niels Little, a single man; and Fay
Alvey) claim no interest in the water rights and properties involved and so stated in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.
Respondents disagree 'vith certain statements made
hy Appellant in the Statement of Facts contained in his
Brief and also call attention as follo,vs to various facts
not recited in Appellant's Brief:
1. Littles' land is traversed by both Castle Creek
and Minnie or Little ·Creek. \Vhile it is correct that part
of it can be watered only from Castle Creek and another
part only from the commingled waters of both Creeks, it
is also true that another part of Littles' land is east of
Minnie or Little Creek and can be watered only from
Minnie Creek ( T. 183, 185, 196, 267-269).
2. At page 3 of Plaintiff's Brief, he refers to a single
diversion used by him, whereas the transcript shows he
has five diversions, at least four of 'vhich "~ere installed
and constructed by him during or after the year 1929
(T. 69-72, 113-115).
3. Plaintiff's lands are traversed only by Minnie or
Little Creek and can be watered only by means of diversions from said Creek. They are located a substantial
distance from and below the confluence of Minnie or
Little and Castle 'Creeks (T. 126-127).
4. Over Respondents' objections and without proper
foundation, the "Morse Decree" and the "Cox Decree"
were admitted in evidence (T. 298-300).
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Plaintiff failed to establish that the parties to "rhom
"·pre purportedly a\varded the \\~aters of "Castle or
~I in niP CrePk'' in the •. n(orse Decree" and those purportedly a\varded by the "'Cox Decree" the waters of
.. Ca~tle and ~Iinnie or Little Creeks, and out of spring
areas tributary to sai(l creeks during the entire year"
\vere actually parties to the actions in \Yhich said Decrees
\rere made.
5. Respondents deny that \\rith the help of the State
Engineer or other\\rise any program was worked out
\\rhereh:~ the parties took the \Yater on turns. The transcript sho\\~s that the Sevier River Commissioner merely
n1ade inspections and examinations, but did not divide
or purport to divide the \Vater or to fix turns or to \vork
out any progran1 of taking \Vater on turns ( T. 272'-273).
R.espondents deny that any turn system \vas ever worked
out by any means (T. 273).
6. \V.hatever rights the parties have in and to the
'vaterf-: of each and both of said ·Creeks are diligence
rights~ based 'On physical appropriation and use prior to
~fay 12, 1903, when Chapter 100 of the Laws of Utah,
1903, became effective, and no rights have been acquired
by appropriation since then through the State Engineer's
Office (T. 8-9). At no time or place did Plaintiff establish
any use of any water on his lands prior to 1904, 1905, or
1906. Any irrigation use made on his lands prior to 1927
was shown to be by means of one dive-rsion for one year
only (in 1904, 1905, or 1906) from Minnie Creek for something between 5 acres and 30 acres of 'Oats (T. 34, 36, 6364).
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7. As a downstream user, Plaintiff has added several
diversions, at least four, since 1919 when ho took over
the property he now operates, ( T. 113-115) and has put
under irrigation substantial acreages, but 'vhen he can1e
on to the property it was almost entirely a sheep-bed and
"had been tramped to death by sheep" and no irrigation
or farming 'vas being conducted. (T. 118-119).
8. The "Cox Decree" admitted in evidence provides
on page 230 thereof as follo,vs :
"IT IS FlTRTHER ORDERED, ADJf~DGED
and DECREED that, except as herein otherwise
specifically provided, all 'va ter shall be measured
to the o'vners and users thereof as of their respective dates of priority, s·o that each user or
owner of the waters herein decreed shall be assured that his right will be satisfied in full before
any subsequent appropriators shall receive any
water whatever; .... "
Plaintiff not only failed to establish any use prior
to 190-i and established only a linlited one-season use
be~t,veen then and 1927 ( T. 22-23, 63-64) but he failed to
establish any priorities of any kind as bet,veen himself
and the Respondents or any of them or in connection
with the rights of any parties to the instant action.
Respondents disagree with Appellant's contention
that the evidence is now to be reviewed in the light most
favorable to him. On the contrary, such evidence is no'v
to be reviewed in the light most favorable to Respondents,
they having prevailed in the trial court. The case of
Martin v. Steve'nS, 121 Utah 485, 2±3 P. 2nd 747, cited by
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Respondent in his Brief, is not applicable to 'our situation,
that having been a jury case.
Throughout the instant Brief, certain matters have
been italicized by us for purposes of emphasis.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT N·O. I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF
PLAINTIFF'S CASE FOR 'THE REASONS CITED BY APPELLANT AND PLAINTIFF IN HIS BRIEF OR FOR ANY
OTHER REASONS WHATSOEVER:
(A)

THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" PURPORTING TO AWARD ALL OF THE FLOW OF
MINNIE AND CASTLE CREEKS ·TO PLAINTIFF
AND THREE O·THER PERSONS DID NO·T EST ABLlSH A PRIMA FACIE RIGHT IN PLAINTIFF
TO AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OR ANY O'THER
PARTICULAR FRACTIONAL PART OF THE
TOTAL FLOW OF SAID STREAMS.

(B)

THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" REFERRED TO IN (A) ABOVE DID NOT REQUIRE
THE COURT TO PROCEED TO DEFINE AND
CLARIFY PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED RIGHT IF
THE SAME BE MORE O·R LESS THAN ONEFOURTH OF THE TO·TAL FLOW OF THE
STREAMS INVO·LVED, AND DID NOT RELIEVE
PLAINTIFF FROM ESTABLISHING THE PRIORITY, NA'TURE, EXTENT, AND MEASURE OF HIS
CLAIMED RIGHT AND THE COMPARATIVE AND
RESPECTVE PRIORITIES OF THE CLAIMED
RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENTS.

(C)

RESPONDENTS AGREE ·THAT NO ENLARGEMENT OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS CAN BE
RECOGNIZED AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE
"COX DECREE" IN NOVEMBER, 1936, NOR, FOR
THAT MATTER, AFTER MAY 12, 1903, BUT CONTEND THAT SUCH FACT OR RULE HAS NO
BEARING ON ANY MATTERS BEFORE THE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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COURT AND DID NOT RELIEVE PLAIN·TIFF
FROM ESTABLISHING BY EVIDENCE THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN CASE,
WHICH HE FAILED TO DO.
ARGU~fENT

POINT NO. I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF
PLAIN'TIFF'S CASE FOR ·THE REASONS CITED BY APPELLANT AND PLAINTIFF IN HIS BRIEF OR FOR ANY
O'THER REASO·NS WHATSOEVER:
(A)

THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" PURPORTING TO AWARD ALL OF THE FLOW OF
MINNIE AND CASTLE CREEKS TO PLAINTIFF
AND THREE O:THER PERSONS DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE RIGHT IN PLAINTIFF
TO AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OR ANY OTHER
PARTICULAR FRACTIONAL PART OF THE
TOTAL FLOW OF SAID STREAMS.

By Appellant's Point No. 1 (A), he urges that the
Court erred in granting Defendants' ~lotion to Disn1iss
because the provisions of the '~Cox Decree" giving all of
the flow of l\{innie and Castle Creeks to Plaintiff and
three other persons established a prima facie right in
Plaintiff to at least one-fourth of the total flo"'" of said
streams. Plaintiff concludes that the wording of said
Decree, at page 18 thereof, makes each of the four persons named, to-wit, Blanche Showalter, 1\{. ·C. Swapp,
James A. Little and John Yardley, the owners of an undivided one-fourth interest in the said Creeks and is
analogous of a situation \Yhere property is granted or
conveyed to two or more individuals. In support of said
conclusion and contention, Plaintiff cities Section 78-1-5,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which was in effect 'vhen
the "Cox Decree" was entered and which states that a
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grant of real estate to t'v-o or more persons in their own
right ~hall be a tenancy in common unless expressly deelared other,vise. Several case and text book citations
are given to the effect that a presumption exists that
realty eonvPyed to two or more persons is owned by them
in co-tenancy and as equal undivided owners.
It i~ signifieant to note, however, that all of the
authorities cited by Plaintiff are confined to '~grants",
•·tran~f~rs", deeds", and "conveyances." Chapter 1 of
'ritle 78 of the Revised Statutes of r: tah, 1933, deals with
conveyances of real estate. Section 78-1-1, Revised Statutes of [Ttah, 1933, ""hich is now Section 57-1-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, reads:
H

Conveyance defined.- The term
"conveyance" as used in this title shall be construed to embrace every instrument in writing by
which any real estate, or interest in real estate, is
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except Wills, and leases for a term not
exceeding one year."
"57 -1-1.

Consequently, when Section 78-1-5, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, stated that a Grant of an interest to two
or 1nore persons created a tenancy in common it referred
to a "grant" or "conveyance" of real estate by an instrument in which real estate or an interest therein was
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned.
Certainly, it cannot be contended that water rights or
interests in water rights, even if considered to be real
estate, can be "created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered
or assigned" by a Decree of the ·Court. A Decree adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
judicating "\Vater rights merely determines existing
ownerships and does not create, alien, mortgage, encumber, assign, eonvey, grant or transfer water rights
or anything else.
The Respondent fails to cite a single case holding
that a Decree adjudicating and determining that several
persons are the owners of certain "\Vater rights makes
them tenants in common, and more particularly, makes
them equal owners.
The "Cox Decree" itself provides the ans"\ver when
it says on page 230 thereof that unless otherwise specifically provided, all waters referred to in the Decree "shall
be measured to the owners and users thereof as of their
respective dates of priority, so that each user or owner
of the waters herein decreed shall be assured that his
right will be satisfied in full before any subsequent appropriators shall receive any 'vater whatever."
Bacon vs. Plain City Irrigation Co., 87 Utah 564, 52
P. 2nd, 427 (1935) holds that the relative date of
priority of a water right is as much a part of an established water right as is the number of second feet covered
by it. Certainly, if Plaintiff had any water right at all,
then his relative· date of priority was part of his case
and it was up to him to establish that, whieh he failed to
do.
The case of Deseret vs. HooppvaniJa, 66 lTtah 25, 239
P. 479, set forth clearly the rule of principle of law that
he who is first in time was first in right. 'Consequently,
it was the Plaintiff's duty to establish who was first in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ti1ne and therPby became first in right, for how much
\Vater, the respective priorities, acreages and uses.
(B)

THE PROVISIONS OF THE "COX DECREE" REFERRED TO IN (A) ABOVE DID NOT REQUIRE
THE COURT TO PROCEED TO DEFINE AND
CLARIFY PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED RIGHT IF
'THE SAME BE MORE O·R LESS THAN ONEFOURTH OF THE TOTAL FLOW OF THE
STREAMS INVOLVED, AND DID NOT RELIEVE
PLAINTIFF FROM ESTABLISHING THE PRIORITY, NA'TURE, EXTENT, AND MEASURE OF HIS
CLAIMED RIGHT AND THE COMPARATIVE AND
RESPECTVE PRIORITIES OF THE CLAIMED
RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENTS.

Plaintiff next contends that the provisions of the
.. Cox Decree" specifying a water right to Plaintiff in
~linnie and Castle ·Creeks required the court to proceed
to define and clarify that right if the same be more or
less than one-fourth of the total flow of the streams.
Here again, Plaintiff's argument is fatally defective in
that he failed to show any water right in either Minnie
or Castle Creeks because he admitted that if he had anything at all, it was a diligence right. Despite this, he
sho"'"ed no use prior to 1904, 1905 or 1906 and therefore
failed to show any rights whatever. Furthermore, the
court is not "required" to proceed and define anything
in such a case as this. It is UP' to the Plaintiff to introduce
evidence which establishes a right in himself, the priority,
nature, quantity and extent thereof, the rights and priorities of those he is suing, and that they have deprived him
of water to which he is entitled. The court cannot "proceed to define and clarify" anything in the absence of
proof which establishes a prima facie case and establishes
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that Plaintiff has so1ne right to the relief he is seeking.
That is the exact reason for Rule 41 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Proeedure, which provides as follo\vs:
" .... After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the
event the motion is not granted, may move for
a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief

"
Furthermore, the Plaintiff did not establish that
anything the Defendants have done or have not done
has resulted in less water being available to Plaintiff
than would have been obtainable by him other\vise.
Plaintiff insists that there is need for the Supreme
Court of Utah to determine for the benefit of the District
'Court whether the ti1ne to be used in deter1nining and
fixing the rights of the parties "Tould be the use 1nade
of the waters in 1936 when the "Cox Decree" \Yas entered
or 1906 when the ''J.\!Iorse Decree" \Yas entered. He conveniently ignores the crucial point \Yhich is 1903 and prior
thereto when the measure and extent of diligence rights
were determined and after "Thich no one could increase
his water rights by physical appropriation and use.
See Chapter 100, Laws of Utah, 1903; and J en.sen v.
Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 P. 1097 (1930),
which holds relative to the application of Chapter 100
of Laws of Utah, 1903, that after ~lay 12, 1903, the effective date of said Chapter, appropriation could only be
accomplished by application through the State Engineer's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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()ffieP, but prior thereto a prior appropriator could acquire "Tater by u~P, but could not increase his demand
after that date and his use of the 'vater so as to deprive
a junior appropriator of any right which he may have
acquired before the increase of use by the prior appropriator.
Plaintiff cites the prayer of his complaint and states
that it asks judgment for the court to clarify and specify
'rith ~pecific verbiage the provisions of the Cox Decree
1nentioned in this complaint. However, certainly Plaintiff is not contending that the prayer of his Complaint
"i.ll supply fatal defects and omissions in proof. It is
up to the Plaintiff to supply evidence which would entitle hin1 to have any such judgment. This he failed to
rlo. Plaintiff 'vould have the Defendants saddled 'vith
the burden of going forward, having once introduced the
HCox Decree,'' and of proving Plaintiff's case. This the
Defendants are not required to do. For the purposes of
this litigation, Defendants need not state that they 'vere
or 'vere not parties to the "Cox Decree" action. That
'\?as part of Plaintiff's burden to establish. Even if they
'vere parties, there were no presumptions. Where the
"rater "'"as purportedly awarded to four persons, it was
then up to one bringing a matter into court to establish
his priority date and the respective priority dates of
those he 'vas suing. In our case the priority date established by Plaintiff proved by his own evidence that he
did not even own a right in either Creek, that he could
not irrigate from one Creek at all, and that the first use
out of Minnie or Little Creek, made by anyone whomSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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soever on Plaintiff's presently owned lands was after
1903, which would mean that Plaintiff has no right. By
his own testimony and the evidence he introduced he
failed to establish in himself either a diligence right acquired before May 12, 1903, or an appropriated right
acquired by application after that date.
(C)

RESPONDENTS AGREE 'THAT NO ENLARGEMENT OF DEFENDAN'TS' RIGHTS CAN BE
RECOGNIZED AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE
"COX DECREE" IN NO·VEMBER, 1936, NOR, FOR
'THAT MATTER, AFTER MAY 12, 1903, BUT CONTEND THAT SUCH FACT OR RULE HAS NO
BEARING ON ANY MATTERS BEFORE THE
COURT AND DID NOT RELIEVE PLAIN·TIFF
FROM ESTABLISHING BY EVIDENCE THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HIS OWN CASE,
WHICH HE FAILED TO DO.

Plaintiff next contends that no enlargement of Defendants' rights can be recognized after the entry of the
"Cox Decree'' in November, 1936. This may be admitted,
but we fail to see where it has any bearing on Plaintiff's
failure to establish a prima facie case or to establish
facts showing that he was entitled to any relief or judgment whatsoever.
The fact that John Yardley testified that he irrigated
125 acres in 1936 and 140 acres from 1936 through 1949
is meaningless. If sufficient water came down to him,
he had a right to use the same, unless, possibly, downstream users made a complaint about his having added
at least four new ditches and diversions and very substantial acreages under irrigation to which he was not
entitled. Those years were admittedly wet years, when
everyone had all the water he wanted. That does not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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P~tablish

that Plaintiff had any rights in the Creeks or
the quantity, priority and extent of any rights he might
r.laim, nor doP~ it establish that during the last ten or
PleYPn drought years, any actions on the part of the
Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of water to which
he ""as entitled, if any.
Defendants agree that \vithout a proper filing and
approval, there could be no extension of water rights
~ince 1936 or for that matter since 1903, except that prior
to 1939 upstrean1 parties could acquire from others by
adverse possession and use already-appropriated rights.
1-[o". PYPr, ,\. e are confronted "\Yith diligence rights, and
Plaintiff, as a downstream users, must rely on 1903 and
prior thereto to establish the measure, extent, acreage,
point of diversion, use and quantity of water to which
he is entitled, in all of " . hich respects he failed. Furthermore, as admitted by his brief, he could not expand his
rights by adverse possession after 1939. Furthermore,
as a downstream user, he could not at any tifme "·adverse"
anyone above hinl, namely, Respondents herein.
Is Plaintiff now contending that by virtue of use
made from 1927 to 1939, he has acquired a title to some
"Tater rights by adverse use and possession~ If that is
his contention, the answer is that he cannot succeed because he 'vas at all times a downstream user.
In W ellst·ille East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d 634 (1943)
it is stated that the general rule is that adverse use will
not "run up stream" and that in a situation in which the
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use of the water is made by one \vhose point of diversion
is located below the headgate of another, such use will
seldom be adverse to the upstream claimant. This san1e
case held that title to water could be acquired by adverse
use bet,veen 1903 and 1939, given all the required elements, namely, seven years of continuous, uninterrupted,
hostile, notorious, and adverse use, under claim of title
exclusive of any other right, but in Smith v. Sanders, 11~
Utah 517, 189 P. 2d 701 (1948) the Court indicated that
Section 100-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, enacted in
1939, prohibited anyone from acquiring a right to the
use of 'vater by adYerse possession after the enactment
of that Statute.
The case of Francis v. RobeJrts, 73 Utah 98, 272 P.
633 (1928) involved a situation ''There Defendant's lands
were mainly meadow and pasture and 'Yere higher in
elevation than Plaintiff's lands, so that the waste or
surplus "Tater from the irrigation of the Defendant's
lands naturally flowed down to Plaintiff's lands. The
Court held that Plaintiff had failed to show that his use
of the water 'vas adverse and hostile to the use by the
Defendants, since no hostility to or denial of the right of
the owners of the upper lands to use the 'Yater "rhenever
they desired had been established.
On the question of adverse possession, if Plaintiff is
relying thereon in view of his failure to establish any
right by appropriation, either before, during or after
1903, by the legal means applicable at any particular time,
it is fundamental that the presumptions are against the
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aequi~ition

of title by adverse use, and that to constitute
~u<'h use the po~~()ssion 1nust be actual, continuous, hostile
to the real owner, and 1nanifest from the nature of the
<'i retunstan('rs so that the O\vner may be i'nformed of it.
Xo ~uch sho\ving has been or can be made in the case
before the Court. See Center Creek Water and Irrigation
Co. vs. ,Jan1es Lindsay, 21 lTtah 192, 60 P. 559, and
Clark vs. North Cottonu,ood Irrigation & Water Co., 79
Utah 425, 11 P. 2d 300.
SU~f~1ARY

It is a matter of established law in the State of r~tah
that the prior appropriator of \Vaters for beneficial use
has a better right to \Vaters than any subsequent appropriator. Brady v. lJf cGonagle, State Engineer, 57 Utah
-!2-t, 193 P. 188. Consequently, it must follow that when
a Plaintiff alleges that someone else has deprived him
of \Vater, the said Plaintiff 1nust establish both his right
and his priority, neither of which was done in the instant
case. There \Vas a complete failure of proof. The· situa.
tion is similar to that which confronted the Court in Lost
Creek Irrigation Company vs. Rex, Jennings, and Jennings, 26 "Ctah 485, 73 P. 660 (1903) which was an action
to quiet title to water rights. The Utah Supreme Court
held that the lower court was in error in awarding each
party half of the waters in the creek in question after
June 15 of each year and the Defendant the high and
surplus \Yaters prior to that date, because such court
could not determine from the evidence what each party
was entitled to. There was no evidence showing the
amount of water necessary for the use of the parties, but
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nevertheless the trial court made a finding that Plaintiff
and Defendant each had diverted and used one-half of the
normal flow. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held
that this was not sustained by the evidence and that the
Plaintiff, having failed to prove by evidence his title to
any definite amount of water, should have been nonsuited.
The action of the lower Court in the instant case in
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint at the conclusion of his
case on the ground that upon the facts and the la'v Plaintiff had shown no right to relief was correct and should
be sustained and affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & ~IATTSSON
Attorneys for the Defendants Little,
151 N. Main, Richfield, Utah;
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for the Defendant
Duncan Findlay
76 So. ~fain, Richfield, Utah;
and
PICKETT & PICKETT
Attorneys for the Defendant, Max
Swapp, as Administrator of the Estate
of M. W. Swapp, deceased, Pickett Bldg.,
St. George, Utah
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